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1. Introduction 
 
It has been contended that the ‗social dimension‘ of the EU is ‗near collapse‘ and that we 
should take a ‗sober view‘ of the potential of European Social Citizenship.2 The original 
concept of European Citizenship was primarily relevant for those citizens who wish and are 
able to move between Member States, while its influence upon the substantive rights of 
settled citizens has been relatively secondary or, at least, indirect. But if there is to be a 
meaningful social dimension to European citizenship it must be transparently effective not 
only for the lives intra-Union migrants, but also for the lives of that vast majority of EU 
citizens who do not move about, but ‗stay at home‘.3 Social rights are, and will continue 
primarily to be, legislated for and administered at national level. Over the years EU 
Directives have certainly had some practical consequences for domestic social protection 
policies across Europe, but EU influence over the rights of European citizens is, as Barbier 
puts it, to ‗be indirectly observed, because of the growing power of EU economic law‘.4 The 
concept of ‗Social Europe‘ has been at best under-realised.5  
 This chapter is concerned with the underlying social meaning of social rights. It draws 
upon the findings of a recent study
6
 that sought to investigate the ways in which social rights 
have been and are now socially and ideologically constructed across Europe. To frame the 
discussion, we shall first consider the relationship between social rights and citizenship, 
before outlining a summary account of the two principal components of that study. The first 
provides a revisionary historical analysis of the development of social rights in a selection of 
European countries. The second offers a tentative analysis of contemporary social rights 
discourse among key policy actors in those countries. In light of the study, the chapter finally 
turns to consider the barriers to consensus regarding the fundamental meaning of European 
social citizenship. 
 
2. Social rights and citizenship 
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It may be argued that social rights are best understood as ‗articulations of human need‘.7 
They are constructed through the process by which human beings socially negotiate the 
naming and claiming of needs and the legitimacy of the demands that human beings place 
upon each other. The earliest human societies, as associations of interdependent beings, will 
have established customary rules for ensuring everyday wellbeing. In their struggle for 
survival and fulfilment, human beings have come in various ways to articulate the ethical 
premises by which to recognise the needs and claims of not only intimates and neighbours, 
but of distant strangers.
8
 In this sense, the construction of social rights preceded the 
emergence of cities or nation states and the development of formal law and political process. 
Social rights, as creatures of struggle and custom were, and are, fundamentally constitutive of 
our humanity. More recently and conventionally, however, social rights have been 
constitutionally constructed at two distinct levels: either concretely as components of welfare 
state citizenship
9
 or more abstractly as elements of the international human rights
10
 
framework. 
 At the citizenship level, social rights are widely regarded as a ‗Western‘ twentieth 
century invention, ushered in by advanced industrial capitalism and the creation of the 
modern welfare state. The ancient origins of citizenship as the exclusive status of a patrician 
male elite gave way, following the so-called European Enlightenment, to new modes of 
governance commensurate with the development of capitalism,
11
 and eventually to 
mechanisms by which, in highly complex affluent societies, it was potentially possible for the 
needs of all citizens to be met through mechanisms of collective distribution.
12
 Citizenship 
could be understood not only as a status, but as a practice: a practice with uneven and 
frequently suboptimal outcomes, not least because citizenship status evolved in ways that 
continued to marginalise, if not exclude, on the basis of class, gender, ethnicity and 
disability.
13
 But social rights had been evolving long before they were identified and named 
as social rights. And the social rights to which modern European welfare states supposedly 
gave birth had been preceded for centuries by a variety of customary, charitable and 
administrative practices, the nature of which inevitably influenced modern forms of social 
citizenship and shaped the emergence of social rights as creatures of policy and law: 
specifically rights to work, social security, health and social care, education and housing. 
 At the human rights level, a new generation of ‗economic, social and cultural rights‘ 
(an expression for which the term ‗social rights‘ is widely treated as a synonymous 
contraction) was formally announced by the UN‘s Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 
1948 (the UDHR). The declaration gave expression, in the wake of two world wars, to a 
loose international consensus,
14
 driven in particular by a social liberal ideal summed up in a 
demand - variously espoused, for example, by Roosevelt
15
 and Beveridge
16
 - for individual 
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freedom from ‗Want‘. The UN eventually in 1966 established separate International 
Covenants to give effect to the Universal Declaration: one for Civil and Political Rights, the 
other for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. The latter allowed for the ‗progressive 
realisation‘ of social rights as creatures of principle and doctrine, requiring state parties in the 
first instance to respect such rights; second to protect such rights; and third, so far as 
resources permitted, to fulfil such rights. In the meantime, the Council of Europe had in 1950 
established the European Convention on Human Rights (the ECHR - primarily a civil and 
political rights treaty), and in 1961 the European Social Charter (the ESC - a social rights 
treaty). The ESC was revised and strengthened in 1996. 
 At the level of the European Union (EU) as a supra-national body, the pertinence of 
social rights has been somewhat ambiguous. The EU began life in 1957 primarily as an 
economic union (the European Economic Community), concerned fundamentally with 
market promotion rather than social protection.
17
 It has since been evolving as an incipient 
political union as much as an economic union, and in recent decades has to sought to extend 
cooperation between Member States into l’espace social,18 explicitly laying claim to a ‗social 
dimension‘.19 The EU promulgated a Charter of Fundamental Social Rights in 1989. 
Elements of this were incorporated as Social Protocols to the 1992 Maastricht Treaty (in 
which some reference to ‗European Citizenship‘ first appeared), the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty, 
and finally into the Lisbon Treaty of 2009, which additionally included a 'horizontal social 
clause' that requires the EU, when defining and implementing its policies and activities, to 
'take into account requirements linked to the promotion of a high level of employment, the 
guarantee of adequate social protection, the fight against social exclusion, and a high level of 
education, training and protection of human health' (Clause 9). Pessimists had previously 
contended that the EU social policy was no more than ‗an empty shell‘.20 Optimists, however, 
suggest that the Lisbon Treaty potentially signified a mainstreaming of social policy issues.
21
 
The EU Charter of Fundamental Social Rights incorporates elements of the ESC, but the 
rights it enshrines are arguably more symbolic than substantive.  
 
3. History 
 
History can tell us about the political and legal construction of social rights, but we are left to 
infer how social rights have been commonly regarded and understood; how the individual has 
been constituted in relation to her claims upon society; and how, by implication, the social 
subject may have been constituted in relation to the state. Politically and legally constituted 
social rights do not necessarily translate into de facto social rights,
22
 nor are they necessarily 
truly ‗social‘ in the sense that they directly represent the substance and meaning of social 
relationships.
23
 The key to the social construction of social rights is the manner in which the 
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subjects or bearers of those rights are constituted. With this in mind, the author has attempted 
to synthesise an analysis of separate accounts, focused on the development of social rights in 
eight European countries. The accounts were specifically prepared for this purpose by 
scholars from each country. The countries included were as follows: 
 
 Two, the Netherlands and Germany, were Western continental European countries and 
each had been founder Members of the European Economic Community in 1957. The 
Netherlands, has been characterised as a ‗corporatist‘ or ‗conservative/social democratic‘ 
hybrid welfare regime. Germany is characteristically regarded as a ‗conservative‘ welfare 
regime. 
 Two, Sweden and Denmark, were Nordic countries, generally classified as ‗social 
democratic‘ welfare regimes. 
 The UK, generally classified as a ‗liberal‘ welfare regime.24  
 Spain, is regarded as a distinctively ‗Southern‘ or ‗Mediterranean‘ welfare regime,25 
though its foundations were strongly conservative/corporatist. 
 Two, Poland and Estonia, were post-communist welfare regimes, albeit that the former is 
inclined to conservative traditions, and the latter to a liberal approach.
26
  
 
Welfare regime classifications, while capturing patterns relating to factors such as de-
commodification and the extent of substantive social protection and provision,
27
 do not 
directly address themselves to social rights. Labour power and essential human services can 
be more or less highly commodified: that is to say, the sale of labour power and the provision 
of human services may to a greater or lesser extent be removed from the sphere of civil rights 
that governs the making of contracts and instead become subject to what may be 
characterised as social rights, but the significance in terms of ‗rights‘ to protection and/or to 
access services will vary depending on just how the citizen or subject is conceptualised or 
constituted and it was to this that the analysis addressed itself. The focus was on a timeframe 
from the latter part of the nineteenth century to the early part of the twenty-first century. This 
is the period in which modern welfare states developed. It was a period punctuated by two 
world wars; by the rise and fall of communism; and by global financial crises. The aim was to 
interpret the narrative accounts provided in relation to historical phases, social policy 
developments and constitutional milestones. A detailed account of the analysis is provided 
elsewhere,
28
 but it identified the following four intersecting influences on the social 
construction of the rights-bearing subject across Europe: 
 
3.1.Religion and the framing of the Poor Laws 
 
In all eight countries, the emergence of the welfare state was preceded by charitable poor 
relief, administered initially at parish level by the Church. Such administration was subject by 
stages to varying degrees of legal regulation through the Poor Laws. Whereas it was 
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originally largely Catholic doctrine that governed the more or less arbitrary collection and 
distribution of alms, following the Reformation, ever closer attention was paid to systematic 
provision and to the distinction between supposedly deserving and undeserving supplicants. 
Famously, Martin Luther urged the prohibition of begging and the reform of relief systems 
(Liber Vagatorum, 1528), and from the sixteenth century onwards the trend towards 
stigmatising conditionality in the administration of poor relief could subsequently be 
observed across Europe in Catholic and Protestant countries alike.
29
 Nevertheless, the tension 
between the underlying logic of Catholic and Protestant traditions continued to have some 
influence on the emphasis and design of secular Poor Laws until the nineteenth century. As 
we have noted, Catholic social doctrine would evolve in ways that would accommodate the 
coming of the modern welfare state, but its initial impetus favoured conservative principles of 
charity and noblesse oblige, casting the individual as a supplicant, subject to the traditions of 
the social order and the authority of the Church; in contrast to the idea of the individual as a 
different kind of supplicant, accountable ultimately, it was supposed, to God, but who‘s 
maintenance and conduct might nevertheless be subject to state regulation.
30
 
 
3.2. Capitalism and the ‘social question’ 
 
It may be seen that across Europe before, or soon after, the turn of the twentieth century there 
was what might be regarded as a strategic social liberal ‗turn‘; a wave of concern amongst 
liberal/bourgeois intellectuals about the social consequences and diswelfares of industrial 
capitalist development. It was a concern motivated as much by self-interest as compassion, 
but an impetus to what might be aptly described as a form of ‗reluctant collectivism‘.31 Social 
liberal thinking may be seen to have played a decisive part in the creation before WWII of 
incipient welfare states in all of the eight countries we have studied. In some instances these 
early developments were interrupted, but in every instance they seem to have provided the 
foundations on which forms of provision for social rights would eventually be founded. What 
these developments had in common was that they each re-constituted those who might have 
been potential supplicants under the Poor Laws as workers within the capitalist economy. 
Social liberalism was not the only ideological influence: social conservative and social 
democratic influences were also at work. But the organising principle around which social 
liberalism achieved a strategic consensus was that of social insurance. The social insurance 
principle appeals uniquely both to individualistic and solidaristic ideals. It entails individual 
contribution and collective risk sharing. It is authoritarian insofar as membership and 
contributions are compulsory and insurance schemes are rule-bound. But it is also 
emancipating, since it creates indisputable rights for workers to benefits, pensions and/or 
health treatment. It provided a common foundation for modern welfare states. 
 
3.3. Constitutional citizenship 
 
There is no straightforward connection between the extent to which, or the manner in which, 
provision for social rights that are explicitly written into national constitutions is reflected in 
countries‘ commitment either to supranational social rights treaties (such as the revised ESC 
or EU Social Protocols), or to the precise configuration of national welfare states. 
Nevertheless, it is through constitutions that rights of citizenship are explicitly or implicitly 
defined. In four of the eight countries studied (Germany, Spain, Poland and Estonia), 
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constitutions with express provision for social rights were adopted, albeit fleetingly, in the 
period between WWI and WWII; in three (Sweden, Denmark and the Netherlands), a clear 
constitutional commitment appeared only after a welfare state was fully established; and the 
UK has never had a written constitution. The earlier constitutions were all quite similar and 
bore the imprint of the social liberal wave alluded to above. The later constitutions reflected 
the language of the UDHR and/or the ECHR/ESC. The common feature of the thinking that 
contributed to all these documents, and by which the citizen as a bearer of rights was 
therefore constructed, was an element of liberal individualism. The subject of social rights 
was, in theory and in part, not only a worker (or, less directly, the dependant of a worker) but 
an individual citizen.
32
 
 
3.4. Changing economic orthodoxies 
 
The ‗Golden Age‘33 of post-WWII social citizenship accommodated a form of social 
liberal/social conservative/social democratic consensus, a phenomenon in which six of the 
eight countries we have studied were able to participate, while two (Poland and Estonia) were 
at that time subject to state communist control, albeit that this did entail state provision for 
the social protection of workers. The crisis that befell the capitalist welfare states in the 1970s 
precipitated changes that have been variously interpreted as retrenchment, residualisation or 
recalibration; and the subsequent era has been variously described as post-industrial, post-
Fordist or post-modern.
34
 Welfare states remained relatively resilient but have responded - to 
a greater or lesser extent - to changes in prevailing economic orthodoxy; a neoliberal 
orthodoxy whose influence extends to the economic priorities adopted by the EU
35
 and, of 
course, to the post-communist countries that have re-entered the capitalist welfare state fold 
since 1990. None of the capitalist welfare states studied have been wholly immune from the 
trend from Keynesian Welfare State to what Jessop has characterised as the Schumpeterian 
Workfare or Competition State,
36
 and in particular, the trend to liberalisation or re-
commodification of public utilities that the EU actively promotes.
37
 As a result the subject of 
social rights may now be socially reconstituted, not as a citizen, but in part as a consumer of 
public services, such as healthcare and educational provision;
38
 or once again in the case of 
workers subject to ‗workfare‘-style labour market activation policies, as a supplicant .39 
 What this review of country case histories tended to confirm was that underlying the 
very different trajectories of these eight European countries were certain key transitions in 
common. The end of the Poor Laws across Europe at, or around, the turn of the twentieth 
century was driven by a social liberal turn, by which certain subjects of social rights who had 
been socially constituted as supplicants were reconstituted as workers facing potentially 
insurable risks. Over time and at different stages welfare state regimes emerged which 
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socially constituted the subjects of social rights - sometimes ambiguously - as citizens of 
equal social status. But since the 1970s, subject to the influence of neoliberal economic and 
managerial orthodoxies, as bearers of social rights, some workers have again been constituted 
in part as supplicants and some citizens have been reconstituted as consumers. The social 
basis for social citizenship in Europe was never uniformly established and, arguably, is now 
unravelling. 
 
4. Discourses 
 
Reflecting afresh on the political and legal evolution of social rights reveals something about 
underlying social processes, but what is the legacy of such processes for the manner in which 
the current generation of European policy actors understand social rights? To investigate this 
question, a series of interviews were conducted in each of the eight countries identified above 
with key informants, including politicians, senior civil servants and professionals engaged in 
the framing, planning, delivery or oversight of social policies: actors with some degree of 
influence, representing dominant strands of opinion within, or close to, each country's 
policymaking establishment. In all, a diverse array of 55 such actors were interviewed. The 
purpose was to explore the discourse of these eight interconnected European social policy 
communities. Once again, a detailed account of the findings has been provided elsewhere.
40
 
However, what the interviews revealed were inconsistent (and sometimes weak) 
conceptualisations of social rights; marked differences in the commitment or legitimacy 
attaching to different kinds of social rights (healthcare and education being more clearly 
regarded as rights than social assistance or housing); ambivalence as to whether responsibility 
for meeting need is, or can be, properly mediated by rights; and a certain tendency to largely 
technocratic categorisations of who is, or may be, the bearer of social rights. 
 More fundamentally, a detailed qualitative analysis of the interview transcripts 
revealed the extent to which respondents were drawing on a mixture of competing conceptual 
discourses. Several respondents made explicit references to the idea of a ‗social contract‘. But 
the apparent meaning attached to this idea varied between respondents and, on occasions, 
even within a respondent‘s own discourse. The various ways in which respondents framed 
their ideas of social rights, or the metaphorical ‗contract‘ on which such rights are premised, 
exhibited some resonance with classic welfare regime models, but it is important to 
emphasise that respondents‘ discourses were not necessarily consistent with the welfare 
regimes of the countries from which they came. What could be detected, however, was an 
array of intersecting discourses encapsulating competing  interpretations of a social contract. 
That array can be captured by way of a strictly heuristic taxonomy illustrated in Figure 8.1. 
The taxonomy has resonance with the author's past attempt to model the discursive moral 
repertoires relating to social citizenship to be found in popular discourse.
41
 Here it may be 
regarded as a methodological device by which to explore the quotidian understandings 
resorted to by the policy actors interviewed for the current study: understandings by which 
they made sense of the often 'ungraspable' complexity of the policy environment in which 
they functioned
42
 and which characterise the 'clumsy solutions' that may be brought to bear - 
even by the most sophisticated policy actors - in a complex world.
43
 
 
                                                          
40
 Dean, H. and A. Brady (2015), The Social Construction of Social Rights across Europe (D6.3 Report).  
41
 Dean, Hartley and Margaret Melrose (1999), Poverty, Riches and Social Citizenship, Basingstoke: Macmillan.  
42
 Sum, Ngai-Ling and B. Jessop (2013), Towards Cultural Political Economy: Putting Culture in Its Place in 
Political Economy, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
43
 Verweij, Marco and Michael Thompson eds. (2006), Clumsy Solutions for a Complex World: Governance, 
Politics and Plural Perceptions, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
8 
 
 
 
The taxonomy presented is constructed around two axes: one distinguishes between 
individualistic and solidaristic orientations to the nature of the contract between the 
individual and society; the other distinguishes between, on the one hand, doctrinal 
conceptions of rights (as rights inherent to personhood) and, on the other, claims-based 
conceptions of rights (as rights that are pragmatically framed and/or contextually grounded). 
The distinctions represented by each axis are dynamic rather than simple binary distinctions: 
the axes are conceptual devices for understanding dialectical processes. Humans negotiate 
life both as individual and as social beings. Rights are realised through an interaction 
between 'top-down' doctrines and 'bottom-up' claims. The labels chosen to characterise the 
different social rights discourses are intended primarily as convenient short-hand identifiers 
and do not imply anything beyond relatively superficial – some will say tenuous – 
philosophical connections. 
 
 A social contract based on a doctrinal conception of rights and a solidaristic orientation 
would espouse an essentially universalistic ethos and cosmopolitan/human rights 
principles. We might label this ‗global‘: that is to say it holds that rights are founded in 
ethical principles and an ideal of shared humanity. ‗Global‘ might here refer literally to 
internationally defined human rights, or metaphorically to shared rights of a community 
or a people. This approach to collective rights and responsibilities is capable of 
accommodating a spectrum of broadly social democratic (including, perhaps, radical 
social liberal) or democratic socialist thinking, within which the individual may be 
framed as a citizen, but fundamentally as a member of human society. By way of 
illustration, it would accommodate the following statement by one of the respondents in 
the study: ‘[Social rights] are based on the concept of human rights and life with dignity. 
… An individual shouldn’t need to rely on his[/her] family or beg for money if (s/)he is in 
need, but society should make funds available.’ 
 A social contract based on a doctrinal conception of rights and an individualistic 
orientation would espouse an essentially utilitarian ethos and a range of constitutional, 
legal or regulatory principles. We might label this neo-Rawlsian. Rawls is celebrated for 
Figure 8.1: Social contract discourse: a taxonomy 
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imagining how members of a hypothetical society - if they were ignorant of the position 
they would hold in that society - might agree to conjoin individual liberty with social 
justice.
44
 Recent followers, such as Stuart White, make a strong argument for rights 
founded in principles of ‗fair reciprocity‘.45 This approach to individual rights and 
responsibilities is capable of accommodating a broad spectrum of liberal approaches to 
‗fairness‘ - from right-wing neoliberalism to centre-ground social liberalism - within 
which the individual may be framed as a citizen, but usually also as an active worker or 
consumer. By way of illustration, it would accommodate the following statement by one 
of the respondents in the study: ‘We have made a social contract [and] if I have a right it 
is up to the state to uphold it. … I also have a responsibility, because the right I have is 
the opportunity to participate in the community I’m in.’ 
 A social contract based on a claims-based conception of rights and a solidaristic 
orientation would espouse a civic-republican ethos and subsidiaristic/social insurance 
principles. We would label this Rousseauian. Rousseau‘s emphasis was on a social 
contract distilled from, and legitimised through, the common will.
46
 This approach is 
concerned with the maintenance of collective commitment and is capable of 
accommodating a spectrum of social Conservative and Christian Democratic thinking. It 
is consistent, for example, which the emphasis in Catholic moral teaching on solidarity 
and subsidiarity. By way of illustration, it would accommodate the following statement 
by one of the respondents in our study: ‘Those who pay taxes and social insurance 
secure the social rights for those who, because of falling into difficulty … rely on the 
solidarity of others. That is how the great risks in life … are financed.’ 
 A social contract based on a claims-based conception of rights and an individualistic 
orientation would espouse an essentially sceptical ethos and subscribe to basic survival 
principles. We have labelled this Hobbesian. Hobbes infamously denigrated social 
existence as a war of all against all, necessitating a bargain whereby certain freedoms 
must be constrained in return for the protection of the individual against the predations of 
others.
47
 His conception of the  
individual and the role of authority drew inspiration from Luther
48
 and was wholly 
consistent with punitive Poor Law traditions. This approach is more concerned with 
individual responsibilities than rights, but accommodates the idea that people should be 
enabled to survive; that there should be a safety net, albeit that it may be subject to 
conditions or judgements as to the moral desert of the supplicant. By way of illustration, 
it is expressed through the minimalism reflected in the following statement by one of the 
respondents in the study: ‗A social right ensures ... that you can survive … that you are 
not dying on the street or dying of starvation.’ 
 
To explore these underlying discourses the interview transcripts were analysed in two 
sweeps: the first, using the taxonomic categorisations outlined above to identify the dominant 
and sub-dominant discourses employed in each transcript; the second to identify from the 
textual context whether participants were expressing (or ‗voicing‘) broad support or criticism 
of their country‘s prevailing social rights regime. Respondents had not necessarily been 
selected on the basis that they were left- or right-wing politicians or commentators or that 
they were government or opposition supporters, so we based our classification of critical and 
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supportive forms of discourse on the content of the transcripts, not the status of the 
respondents. The outcome may be regarded as a snapshot of the pattern of discourses to be 
found among a disparate community of policy actors from across the EU. The balance 
between supportively and critically voiced discourses varied between countries, but overall 
there was twice as much supportively voiced framing as critically voiced framing. This, 
however, was of less relevance than the distribution of supportively and critically voiced 
framing within each category of discourse: the discourses appeared to provide the essential 
terrain upon which agreement and disagreement could occur. It could clearly be seen that 
there was no unanimity across Europe as to the understanding of social rights. What is more, 
variation of discourse and understanding within countries would appear to have been as 
significant as variations between countries. 
 
• Neo-Rawlsian discourse was prevalent and, arguably, hegemonic. It was generally 
dominant, especially in the context of voices supportive of prevailing regimes. 
• Rousseauian discourse had a strong presence, whether voiced in a supportive or critical 
context.  
• Critical voices were especially evident within ‗global‘ discourse. 
• Hobbesian discourse was not that much in evidence. Unsolicited concerns were expressed 
by respondents with regard to alleged social rights ‗tourism‘, but such concerns may have 
stemmed less from judgementalism towards migrants on the part of the respondents as 
from their sensitivity to controversy driven by popular opinion. 
 
There were disjunctures between social rights oriented discourse and social policy oriented 
discourse. These two orientations are not necessarily coterminous. Social policy may be 
framed without regard to the consideration of social rights, and yet social rights may be 
realised nevertheless. Conceptions of social rights as rights of citizenship, if they existed in 
the minds of policy actors, could vary, they could be contradictory, or they could be 
confused. Certainly, the association between social rights and any idea of cosmopolitan, 
supra- or post-national citizenship was at best tenuous. The barriers to the defence and 
promotion of social citizenship in Europe lay not so much with prevailing inconsistencies in 
the de facto realisation of social rights, as with conceptual uncertainty and ideological 
diversity.  
 
5. Barriers to the consensual construction of supranational social rights 
 
The evidence discussed above suggests that the original commitment to social rights and the 
welfare state across Europe became sustainable by virtue of a consensus initially stimulated 
by a social liberal impetus. This was an impetus that may have stemmed at different moments 
and in various ways: for example, from the legacy of Thomas Paine's radical liberalism;
49
 
from the nineteenth century Krausist movement which facilitated accommodation between 
secular and religious thinking; and later, from emergent strands of mid-twentieth century 
liberalism, such as German 'ordoliberalism'
50
 and in the Anglophone world the social 
liberalism of F.D. Roosevelt and Beveridge. Together these amounted to a form of liberalism, 
arguably, more tolerant of ideological pluralism than the currently prevailing economistic 
neoliberal orthodoxy; a liberalism to which the competing solidaristic principles of social 
conservatism and social democracy could in part at least accommodate themselves. We have 
seen, however, that the hegemonic conception of citizenship across Europe appears 
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increasingly liberal/individualistic, rather than social liberal. In so far as the EU continues to 
appeal to solidarity, its appeals of late have been to solidarity between nations in the face of 
global economic and migration crises, not solidarity between citizens.  
 It is contended above that the bearer of social rights within the modern welfare state 
was first constituted as a worker.
51
 During the Western European era first heralded by the 
Westphalian Treaty
52
 and later consummated by the rise of industrial capitalism, the legal 
status and self-identity of nation sates and wage labourers were forged in conjunction with 
one another. Solidarity between citizens was premised on a coincidence of national and 
worker identity that does not necessarily apply in the post-Westphalian, post-industrial 
capitalist era. The dominant principle on which the earliest welfare states were founded was 
the social insurance principle; upon nationally organised risk sharing between individual 
workers. The application of the principle was initially pioneered in Germany by Bismark 
(who - it should be noted - was both a Conservative and a Protestant), where it was embraced 
by the opposing forces of Catholicism, on the one hand, and Social Democrats, on the other. 
The essential principle was adopted across Europe and beyond. But the social liberal impetus 
and the social insurance principle have together been undermined as the status and identity of 
both nation states and individual workers were eroded, by globalisation;
53
 by the changing 
nature of work under capitalism;
54
 and by secular shifts in the nature and cultural 
understanding of individual risk.
55
 
 The bearer of social rights may now be constituted as much as the consumer of social 
services as a worker or, if she is not wholly self-sufficient, as much as a supplicant in need of 
conditional social support as a citizen. The basis for solidarity between citizens based on the 
social insurance principle has not been eclipsed, but it has been weakened, even within the 
classic Bismarkian states of continental Europe (Palier 2012).
56
 We have seen that, to varying 
extents, wider solidaristic convictions survive within policymaking discourse,
57
 though they 
may be overshadowed by neo-liberal assumptions. Arguably, a more solidaristic form of 
European social citizenship must axiomatically embrace a supranational perspective; it must 
recognise that citizenship need not be primarily constituted through labour market 
participation; it must seek a risk-sharing principle that, as the social insurance principle once 
did, can be accommodated to competing ideological perspectives, or to competing discursive 
constructions of a social contract. Let us consider the implications of each of the ideal types 
of discursive construction identified above and the prospects of their accommodation to some 
form of consensus. 
 
5.1.'Global' social contact discourse: a hopeless cause? 
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What was characterised above as the 'global' social contract discourse encompasses the social 
citizenship ideal that is in principle most evidently capable of embracing a supranational 
perspective, but as we have seen it appears to be far from dominant among European policy 
actors. The leap from social rights premised upon national citizenship to social rights 
premised on a global/human rights perspective remains elusive so long as the supposed 
universality of certain social rights is constrained by residency requirements based on 
national boundaries (see Chapter 4, this volume). The possibility of a world that could 
accommodate migration without borders, though debated,
58
 has - in terms of its relevance for 
social rights - been at best only partially achieved within the limited compass of the EU. 
 Applied to the ideal of social Europe, the universalistic logic underpinning the 'global' 
social contract discourse implies that that social rights should become effectively pan-
European. Such a goal has found one form of expression in calls for a Universal Basic 
Income such as that proposed as recently as 2013 by a European Citizens‘ Initiative, which 
sought, in the long term: 
 
to offer to each person in the EU the unconditional right as an individual, to having 
his/her material needs met to ensure a life of dignity as stated by the EU treaties, and to 
empower participation in society supported by the introduction of the UBI. 
[http://ec.europa.eu/citizens-initiative/public/initiatives/obsolete/details/2013/000001 - 
accessed 10 August 2016] 
 
The initiative attracted only 285,000 signatures or ‗statements of support‘ from EU citizens, 
and so failed by some margin to pass the overall 1 million signature threshold required to 
secure its formal consideration. The concept of a universal basic income, or a Citizen‘s 
Income, has been widely discussed. It is the subject of ongoing international debate under the 
auspices of BIEN (the Basic Income Earth Network - see www.basicincome.org). Limited 
forms of basic income have been introduced in places as diverse as Alaska and Iran. Small-
scale experiments have been conducted in Canada, Namibia and India and are planned within 
Europe in the Netherlands (in Utrecht) and Finland. Albeit for different reasons, various 
versions of the basic income concept find favour among commentators from the radical left,
59
 
the radical right
60
 and among a spectrum of social policy experts,
61
 but they struggle to find 
wider support. A basic income proposal presented in a referendum in Switzerland in 2016 
was decisively rejected by the electorate. For the present it represents, perhaps, more of a 
totemic ideal than a practical proposition.  
 We may reflect more generally that the evolution and the purchase of a 'global' social 
contract ideal within social policy is constrained by barriers raised through trends that have 
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bolstered the three other competing social contract discourses, making an accommodation 
between discourses more difficult. The quest for a common understanding of social 
citizenship rights faces what might be described as a trilemma: a confluence of three 
movements, each with conflicting priorities - first, demands for welfare austerity and 
restricted social rights; second, the trend to the individualisation of social risk and greater 
selectivity of social rights; and third, the emergence of welfare state chauvinism, portending 
potentially an end to the social European ideal. We shall consider each in turn. 
 
5.2.Neo-Rawlsian social contract discourse and the 'austerian' turn  
 
What was characterised above as the neo-Rawlsian social contract discourse encompasses a 
social citizenship ideal in which rights and duties of the individual and the community are 
'fairly' balanced, albeit that the balancing process may be perceived in terms of an 
increasingly austere reciprocal calculus. There is nothing new about demands for austerity in 
times of economic difficulty,
62
 nor the 'alchemic' synthesis of economic and moral 
imperatives implied by such demands.
63
 What characterises the emergence of twenty-first 
century demands for welfare state retrenchment and permanent austerity
64
 is not so much the 
economic logic of neoliberal argument as the cultural hegemony of what has been 
characterised as an 'austerian ideology',
65
 which came to a head with the global financial and 
fiscal crises precipitated in 2008. 
 A social liberal compromise with austerian neo-liberalism had been sought - in 
various guises by Clinton in the USA, Blair in the UK and Schröder in the Germany - in the 
1990s and early 2000s through the 'Third Way' project.
66
 A key component of that 
compromise was the idea of 'social investment': a reframing of social expenditure as 
productive investment in human capital, rather than supposedly wasteful spending.
67
 The 
paradigm of social investment has lately undergone something of a revival.
68
 It advocates 
neither a return to Keynesian expansionism nor a continuation of neoliberal supply-side 
oriented welfare retrenchment, but an emphasis on productive potential of policies to enhance 
early childhood development, higher education and skills training, work-family 
reconciliation, and active ageing. Such policies can most certainly win some favour among 
both social democrats and economic liberals, but the underlying logic is essentially 
instrumentalist. Social rights are constituted as a means to an economic end, rather than as an 
inherent component of citizenship: the fairness of the social contract is evaluated with 
primary reference to the productive potential of the citizen. 
 
5.3.Rousseauian social contract discourse and the individualisation of risk  
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What was characterised above as the Rousseauian social contract discourse encompasses a 
social citizenship ideal in which rights derive from the sharing of risk. In so far as this was an 
ideal largely associated with Western continental Europe, it has been weakened as classically 
corporatist welfare states have, on the one hand, incrementally diluted the redistributive 
principles informing collective social insurance systems in favour of stricter actuarial 
principles and, on the other, responded to the changing nature of social risks through the 
introduction of flat-rate, tax-financed, non-contributory benefits to provide a social minimum 
for vulnerable social groups and targeted benefits for those excluded from the labour 
market.
69
 These changes may be associated in part with global cultural shifts favouring 
greater individualism
70
 and in part with the consequences of new social risks arising from 
socio-demographic trends affecting all developed economies.
71
 
 Nevertheless, social insurance arrangements had in some instances, as in the case of 
the classic Nordic model, been made deliberately 'encompassing' or inclusive.
72
 Declining 
schemes - such as that in the UK - could be revitalised and modified to provide more 
extensive coverage so as to meet the needs of citizens with restricted labour market access.
73
 
Alternatively, it has been suggested, social insurance schemes could be not replaced, but 
supplemented by a form of Participation Income - a form of basic income that recognises 
social as well as economic contributions on the part of the citizen.
74
 The global trend, 
however, is not in this direction. The popularity of contributory social insurance appears to be 
in decline and the strength of neoliberal economic opinion that prefers conditional social 
assistance. It is symbolically significant that even the ILO - as a long-term international 
defender of the social insurance principle - has recently brokered an agreement between the 
developing countries of the world that promotes, not Social Security for All (as in the past), 
but a Social Protection Floor
75
: a vision that incorporates a role for targeted social assistance 
rights. 
 
5.4.Hobbesian social contract discourse and populist resistance to cosmopolitanism  
 
What was characterised above as the Hobbesian social contract discourse encompasses a 
restrictive social citizenship ideal that seeks to defend the interests of the individual against 
unwarranted claims by others. From the perspective of the policymaker it is an ideal that 
might favour minimal social entitlements and/or entitlements based on moral desert. But from 
the perspective of the ordinary citizen it is an ideal that demands the defence of such 
entitlements as they have against erosion by others: by underserving members of their own 
society and/or by outsiders. As we have seen, the Hobbesian discourse among the European 
policy actors interviewed for the study described above was not much in evidence, except as a 
reflection of, or as a response to, popular anxieties. 
 Popular anxieties of this nature, expressed through right-wing populist movements, 
appear to have been rising since the 1990s, when they were first attributed to a form of 
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'welfare state chauvinism'.
76
 It has been suggested that social and ethnic diversity may be 
fundamentally inimical to the solidarity required politically to support extensive social rights 
provision.
77
 Such claims are refuted by evidence that strong welfare states can promote 
tolerance of diversity.
78
 Nevertheless, there is evidence of support for welfare state 
chauvinism - as both a socio-economic and a socio-cultural phenomenon - across Europe.
79
 
Such support may be fuelled by 'austerian' ideology and the idea that access to finite 
resources must be rationed, but it is also underpinned by a moral-authoritarian rejection of the 
idea that others - of a different culture, ethnicity or nationality - should enjoy the same rights 
as supposedly indigenous citizens. It is widely contended that populist sentiment of this 
nature played some part at least in the outcome in 2016 of the UK referendum on EU 
membership and has led to 'Brexit'.
80
 
 But, of course, recent events across Europe have also given birth to very different 
anti-establishment popular movements, fuelled primarily by resistance to neoliberal austerity, 
yet implicitly informed by awareness of social rights as a collective good, rather than a 
residual burden.
81
 The Occupy movement that had a presence in several Northern European 
cities
82
 and new parties mobilising significant popular support - Podemos in Spain, the Five 
Star Movement in Italy, Syriza in Greece - suggest in disparate ways that it is sometimes 
possible for bottom-up social movements to demand inclusive social rights. Nevertheless, the 
strength of Hobbesian populism's opposition to a cosmopolitan European ideal appears to 
impose a significant constraint on the realisation of a genuinely transnational form of 
European social citizenship. 
 
5.5.Social contract discourse and the migrant 
 
While the focus within much of this volume is upon the social rights of intra-EU migrants, 
the deliberate focus of this chapter, and the research on which it is founded, has been upon 
EU citizens in general. Nevertheless, our discussion of social contract discourse provides a 
context that has implications for the manner in which the migrant, including the intra-EU 
migrant citizen, might be socially constructed.
83
 The social contract alluded to by respondents 
in our study of European policy actors was primarily a national social contract, to which the 
migrant – whether she be a third country national of a citizen of another EU country – would 
be a stranger. Certainly, within the Hobbesian social contact discourse, the intra-EU migrant 
might characteristically be constructed as an alien intruder and a total stranger to the national 
social contact. Within the Rousseauian social contact discourse, the intra-EU migrant might 
characteristically be constructed as a guest and, at best, a temporary or partial party to the 
national social contact. Within the Rawlsian social contact discourse, the intra-EU migrant 
might characteristically be constructed as potential settler and, perhaps, a conditional party to 
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the national social contact. The exception here would be the global social contract discourse. 
This discourse could apply 'globally', as we have seen, either to a notional contract between 
the individual and humanity, or metaphorically to a universal contract between every resident 
and the state within which she resides. By either interpretation, the migrant might be 
acknowledged not as a stranger, but as a newly arrived party to a social contract realised at a 
national level. It should be noted, however, that the idea of a social contact between the EU 
citizen and the EU as a supranational entity was never explicitly raised and appeared to be 
quite absent from the discourses drawn upon by the policy actors in our study. When 
considered specifically in relation to the social rights of migrants, EU citizenship is an idea 
that does not seem to have taken hold, or else has been obscured or residualised by national 
preoccupations. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
Barriers to a consensus of meaning across Europe that might match that which informed the 
development of social rights in the classic national welfare states within Europe may be 
insuperable. It is unlikely that the ideal of a shared European citizenship is one that can 
extend to a shared form of social citizenship in the Marshallian sense. But diverse forms of 
social citizenship will continue to develop. The challenge for the EU, if it is to survive, is 
better to comprehend the clumsy contradictions and the constructive commonalities of 
understanding both between and within its Member States. The question for the EU is how 
best to nurture a critically supportive framework to optimise the effectiveness and 
sustainability of the complex array of social rights that already exist or that may emerge in 
different countries across Europe.  
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